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ABSTRACT 
 
This study seeks to find out whether there are systematic differences between early 
adopters and a matched control group of non early adopters of FRS 114 (Segment 
Reporting) based on the following company characteristics: (1) firm size, (2) board 
characteristics, (3) leverage, (4) audit firm size, and (5) firm growth rate. Using a sample 
of 32 early adopters and without differentiating whether they disclose the required 
segment information in full or partially and a control group of 32 non early adopters, our 
findings indicate company with higher proportion of non executive directors, particularly 
non independent non executives, is more likely to adopt FRS 114 before the effective date.  
When early adopters are further classified into full or partial adopters, the result shows 
that full early adopters are significantly larger (in terms of total assets) than non early 
adopters. However, when comparing between partial early adopters and non early 
adopters, the evidence suggests that partial early adopters are significantly smaller in 
size than non early adopters. We find no evidence to indicate that there are significant 
differences between full early adopters, partial early adopters and non early adopters in 
terms of board size, board leadership, independent directors, audit firm size, leverage 
and firm growth rate.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When an accounting standard permits alternative accounting methods (for 
example, LIFO vs. FIFO inventory valuation) or allows flexible presentation 
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format (for example, direct or indirect method to describe cash flows from 
operation), management is presented with a voluntary accounting choice. There 
are extensive studies on discretionary accounting choice made by management. 
These studies largely focus on two fundamental research questions, namely:           
(1) what motivate managers to choose a particular accounting method, and               
(2) what are the implications of the choice made. Fields et al. (2001) provide a 
critical review of the empirical research on accounting choice by giving emphasis 
on research published in the 1990s. They conclude that the evidence on the 
motivations behind accounting methods choice is largely circumstantial and 
direct and compelling evidence is still elusive.  
 
Early adoption of an accounting standard prior to its effective date is another 
dimension of a voluntary accounting choice. In most cases, early adoption affects 
the income statement or balance sheet accounts. In other cases, early adoption 
affects the level of disclosure or merely changes the format of the financial 
statements without affecting the account balances. Studies on early adoption to 
date invariably use accounting standards in the United States (US) such as SFAS 
8, SFAS 52, SFAS 86, SFAS 87, SFAS 96 and SFAS 106 that have income and 
balance sheet ramifications. Ayres (1986), Trombley (1989), Tung and Weygandt 
(1994), and Amir and Livnat (1996) examine the characteristics of early adopters. 
Salatka (1989), and Amir and Ziv (1997) investigate the economic consequences 
of early adoption and Gujarathi and Hoskin (1992), Balsam et al. (1995), and 
Karmon and Lubwama (1997) document opportunistic behavior motivates 
managers to be early adopters. 
 
This study extends the literature on the timing of accounting standard adoption on 
two fronts. Firstly, it examines early adoption in a non-US setting by focusing on 
Malaysia and secondly it uses an accounting standard that leads to greater 
information disclosure without affecting income or balance sheet accounts. 
Although there are several studies that examine factors that motivate accounting 
method choice and voluntary disclosures in Malaysia, we are not aware of any 
empirical studies that seek to explain early adoption of accounting standards in 
Malaysia. In addition, segment reporting is clearly a deserving area to study 
following recent calls for improvement in segment disclosures (see for example 
the OECD's White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia, 2003; AIMR 
Corporate Disclosure Survey, 2000).  
 
In Malaysia, since 1987 and up until recently, companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange or KLSE) were 
required to comply with the original International Accounting Standard (IAS) 14.  
The revised IAS 14 which became effective for periods beginning on or after           
1 July 1998 is not adopted in Malaysia. With the introduction of MASB 22: 
Segment Reporting in 2001 (renamed FRS 114 with effect from 1 January 2005), 
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listed companies in Malaysia are now required to disclose segment data similar to 
the requirements under the revised IAS 14 for the periods beginning on or after          
1 January 2002. The FRS 114-cum-IAS 14 (revised) presents major departures 
from the original IAS 14. The differences include the adoption of two-tier 
segmentation with either the business segment or the geographical segment as the 
dominant basis of segment reporting (primary) and the other secondary, 
differential information disclosure for primary segment (full disclosure) and 
secondary segment (less disclosure), consistent use of accounting policies across 
segments and standardized measure of segment results across companies. 
 
By electing to adopt FRS 114 prior to its effective date, companies voluntarily 
disclose more information especially for the primary basis of segment reporting 
since they have to provide additional disclosures such as depreciation and 
amortization expenses and other significant non-cash expenses by reportable 
segments to enable users to "predict the overall amounts, timing, or risks of a 
complete enterprise's future cash flows". In addition, unlike the original IAS 14, 
FRS 114 also requires disclosures of segment liabilities in the primary segment 
reports and capital expenditure in both the primary and secondary segment 
reports, if any. 
 
Given that early adoption of FRS 114 is similar to providing voluntary 
disclosures, this study seeks to find out whether there are systematic differences 
between early adopters and a matched control group of non early adopters of FRS 
114 based on the following company characteristics: (1) firm size, (2) board 
characteristics, (3) leverage, (4) audit firm size, and (5) firm growth rate. Recent 
studies seeking to explain the determinants of specific disclosures which are 
similar to ours include Prencipe (2004) which examines voluntary segment 
disclosures in Italy, Watson et al. (2002) which examines disclosure of 
accounting ratios in the United Kingdom (UK) and Wallace et al. (1999) which 
examines the comprehensiveness of cash flow reporting in the UK. 
 
Using a sample of 32 early adopters and without differentiating whether they 
disclose the required primary segment information in full or partially and a 
control group of 32 non early adopters, our findings indicate that firm with higher 
proportion of non executive directors, particularly non independent non 
executives, is more likely to adopt FRS 114 earlier. Inspired by Powell (1997), 
when early adopters are further classified into full or partial adopters, the result 
shows that the likelihood to early adopt FRS 114 in full is greater for larger firm 
(based on total assets).  However, when comparing between partial early adopters 
and non early adopters, the evidence suggests that partial early adopters are 
significantly smaller in size than non early adopters. Furthermore, full and partial 
early adopters also tend to have significantly greater proportion of non 
independent non executive directors than non early adopters. We find no 
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evidence to indicate that there are significant differences between full early 
adopters, partial early adopters and non early adopters in terms of board size, 
board leadership, proportion of  independent directors, audit firm size, leverage 
and firm growth rate.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief review 
of the relevant literature and formulate the hypotheses. The methodology section 
describes the identification of early adopters, procedure adopted to match early 
adopters against non early adopters, data collection, regression methods used and 
the sample characteristics. The findings discuss results from univariate and 
multivariate analysis. The final section contains conclusion, limitations and 
suggestions for future research. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Empirical studies investigating the determinants of extensiveness of segment 
disclosures, levels of voluntary disclosures or comprehensiveness of mandatory 
disclosures around the world invariably consider company specific factors such 
as firm size, board composition, financial leverage, audit firm size, firm growth 
rate and earnings volatility to explain the varying levels of disclosures. Ahmed 
and Courtis (1999) provide a meta-analysis of 29 comprehensive disclosure 
studies between 1968 and 1997 and conclude that disclosure levels have positive 
relationships with firm size and leverage.1 They conclude the lack of conclusive 
findings between other company attributes and corporate disclosure is due to 
differences in disclosure index construction and definition of the explanatory 
variables. 
 
We present below the arguments on how the above company-specific factors may 
influence the level of disclosures, the empirical evidence to date and testable 
hypotheses.   
 
Firm Size 
 
Firth (1979) and Dye (1985) note that large firms are less susceptible to 
competitive disadvantages through greater disclosures of proprietary information.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that large firms are generally exposed to 
political costs imposed by governmental regulatory bodies, tax agencies and 
interest groups in the forms of price controls, higher corporate taxes and 
adherence to socially responsible behavior. Crasswell and Taylor (1992) suggest 
                                                 
1 They exclude studies that examine specific disclosures such as segment reporting and corporate 
social reporting. 
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that to minimize the political attacks and reduce the political costs large firms can 
enhance their corporate image through comprehensive disclosure of information. 
Barry and Brown (1986), and Lang and Lundholm (1996) posit that larger firms 
have an incentive to disclose more than smaller firms because the annual reports 
of the larger firms are more likely to be scrutinized by financial analysts. 
  
The results of empirical studies are generally supportive of a positive relationship 
between firm size and level of disclosure.  Singhvi and Desai (1971), Firth 
(1979), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), 
Mitchell et al. (1995), Herrmann and Thomas (1996), Ahmed and Courtis (1999), 
Eng and Mak (2003), and Prencipe (2004) find a positive relationship between 
company size and level of disclosure. A study in Malaysia by Chow and Susela 
Devi (2001) also indicates that segment disclosure is positively related with firm 
size.  
 
Based on the above discussion, the relationship between firm size and the level of 
disclosure is expected to be positive and thus we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1:  Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between firm 
size and early adoption of FRS 114. 
 
Board Composition 
 
A Chief Executive Officer (CEO) who is also Chairman of the Board usually 
signifies that the management is controlled by a dominant personality (Molz, 
1988). The person who occupies both roles, i.e., duality board leadership, tends to 
withhold information to external users. Fama and Jensen (1983), and Forker 
(1992) assert that the larger the proportion of outside or non executive directors 
on the Board, the more effective they are in monitoring management and 
corporate boards resulting in lower managerial opportunism and tendency to 
withhold information. Thus, outside or non executive directors on the Board 
would improve the quality of financial disclosure. Similarly, Chen and Jaggi 
(2000) argue that greater representation of independent non executive directors 
on corporate board enable them to exert greater influence on management and 
encourage better compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements.  Likewise, 
Eng and Mak (2003) assert that outside directors who are less aligned to 
management have greater tendency to encourage firm to disclose more voluntary 
information to outside investors. 
 
Forker (1992) finds a significant negative relationship between the existence of a 
dominant personality and the quality of share option disclosure in the UK. 
Contrary to expectation, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) show that the presence of non 
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executive chairman on board is negatively associated with the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in Malaysia. Chen and Jaggi (2000) find a positive relationship 
between the proportion of independent directors on board and comprehensiveness 
of mandatory financial disclosure in Hong Kong. However, Eng and Mak (2003) 
find that higher outside directorship reduces voluntary disclosure. 
 
In Malaysia, the role of independent directors in improving corporate governance 
is also recognized. The voluntary Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
released in 2000 recommends: (1) the separation of Board Chairman and CEO, 
and (2) at least one third of corporate board is made up of independent directors. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, we hypothesized that:   
 
H2a:  Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between CEO 
duality and early adoption of FRS 114. 
 
H2b:  Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the 
proportion of non executive directors and early adoption of 
FRS 114. 
 
Financial Leverage 
 
Agency theory predicts a positive relationship between leverage and disclosure. 
Fama and Miller (1972), and Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that agency costs 
are higher for firms with high level of debts in their capital structure due to the 
potential wealth transfer from debtholders to shareholders. Smith and Warner 
(1979) suggest that by supplying more information to debt suppliers, voluntary 
disclosure can reduce these agency costs.  In the same vein, McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe (1993) argue that by providing segment information, debt suppliers 
can make better predictions about the growth, risks and return prospects of 
diversified company, or group of companies.    
 
The results that emanate from a number of empirical studies that investigate the 
relationship between financial leverage and corporate disclosures are conflicting. 
Trotman and Bradley (1981), Tung and Weygandt (1994), and Ahmed and 
Courtis (1999) find there is a positive relationship between financial leverage and 
the level of disclosures. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) find no significant 
association between leverage and voluntary disclosures. On the other hand, Eng 
and Mak (2003) find that disclosure decreases with leverage. In the area of 
segment reporting, studies by Bradbury (1992), Mitchell et al. (1995), and Chow 
and Susela Devi (2001) show that there is a positive relationship between 
financial leverage and the level of segment disclosure.  
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We expect that companies with high leverage would provide more information in 
their annual reports such as segment liabilities so that creditors can make a better 
prediction about the ability of the companies to settle their debt and to assure 
debtholders that their claims are not diluted.   Accordingly, we hypothesized: 
 
H3:  Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between 
leverage and early adoption of FRS 114. 
 
Audit Firm Size 
 
Titman and Trueman (1986) argue that prestigious auditor has a reputational 
capital at stake and to preserve this capital, the quality of services they provide 
has to be maintained through the accuracy of audited information provided by 
their clients.  Watts and Zimmerman (1986) suggest that the choice of external 
auditors serves as a mechanism to lessen the agency costs arising from the 
conflicts of interest between the principal and agents. Although large audit firm is 
expected to enhance corporate disclosure, the evidence on the influence of audit 
firm size on the level of disclosure is inconclusive. Chow and Wong-Boren 
(1986), and Ettredge et al. (1988) show that larger audit firms are significantly 
associated with better quality audit and disclosure. However, Firth (1979), 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999), and Eng and Mak (2003) find that there is no 
relationship between audit firm size and the level of disclosure.  
 
As a large audit firm is perceived to provide higher quality audit than small firm, 
we expect that company audited by "Big 4" audit firm would disclose more 
information and is encouraged to elect for early adoption of FRS 114, thus: 
 
H4:  Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between audit 
firm size and early adoption of FRS 114. 
 
Growth Rate 
 
The proprietary costs or discretionary disclosure theory asserts that companies 
have incentives to voluntarily disclose relevant information to the market in order 
to reduce information asymmetry and the cost of capital (Verrecchia, 1983). 
Furthermore, the theory states that companies limit voluntary disclosure when 
costs of preparing, disseminating, auditing and disclosing information are greater 
than the expected benefits. The discretionary costs that disclosing firms have to 
bear include competitive disadvantage or bargaining disadvantage from providing 
strategic information to existing or potential competitors, suppliers and 
customers. 
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In the case of segment reporting, segment information may reveal the existence 
of business opportunities to competitors and harm the disclosing firm's 
competitive position. Thus the competitive costs arising from disclosing segment 
information tend to be particularly high for growing companies. Surveys by 
Susela Devi and Veerinderjeet (1992), and Edwards and Smith (1996) among 
audit managers and financial directors respectively indicate that the fear of 
competitive disadvantage from disclosing segmental information is real. 
However, an empirical study by Prencipe (2004) finds that there is an 
insignificant relationship between the extent of segment reporting and firm 
growth rate. Given that the proprietary costs theory predicts a negative 
relationship between firm growth rate and disclosure, our last hypothesis is: 
 
H5:  Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between growth 
rate and early adoption of FRS 114. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Sample Selection and Data Source 
 
A total of 64 companies comprising 32 early adopters of FRS 114 and a control 
group of 32 non early adopters are examined in this study.  Early adopters are 
mainly identified by searching the 2001 and 2002 annual reports and/or annual 
audited accounts (excluding financial statements ended on 31 December 2002) in 
the Bursa Malaysia database (available at http://announcements.bursamalaysia 
.com) for distinguishing phrases such as "primary reporting", "segment 
liabilities", "MASB 22", "standard 22" and "standard no 22".  The early adopters 
are matched on a paired basis with non early adopters based on similar board of 
exchange (main or second board), sectoral classification, financial year end and 
number of business segments (plus or minus one is acceptable if exact matching 
is not possible).  
 
For all the sample companies, we hand collected information from the annual 
reports relating to board composition [size of board, number of non executives 
(NONEXE) comprising independent directors (INDEP) and non independent non 
executive directors (GRAY)], board leadership and auditor. The number of 
business and geographical segments for the sample companies are obtained from 
the segment disclosures in the notes to the financial statements. Financial data 
such as total assets (TA), total liabilities, profit before tax (PBT) are taken from 
the KLSE-RIS (available at http://www.klse-ris.com.my).  
 
As described in Wan Hussin et al. (2003), we scrutinized the early adopters' 
segment disclosures and coded the accounting treatments for the ten mandatory 
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items in the primary segment reporting format as follows: (A) allocated to 
segments; (U) disclosed in aggregate in segment report without allocating to 
segments, i.e., unallocated; (NA) not applicable (since the items are also not 
disclosed elsewhere in the consolidated financial statements); and (ND) not 
disclosed in segment report although they are disclosed elsewhere in the 
consolidated financial statements. Early adopters with at least one item 
designated "ND" are deemed not complying fully with FRS 114 disclosures and 
categorized as partial early adopters, and the remaining are labeled full early 
adopters. These procedures yield 15 full and 17 partial early adopters. 
 
Early Adoption Model 
 
We run two logistic regression models; binary and multinomial. In the binary 
model, the dependent variable is dichotomous and takes the value of either                 
1 (early adopters) or 0 (non early adopters) and in the multinomial model, the 
dependent variable is trichotomous and takes the value of  0  (full early adopters), 
1 (partial early adopters) and 2 (non early adopters). The motivation to run both 
binary and multinomial models comes from Powell (1997). He shows that in 
modeling the relationship between firm's characteristics and its takeover 
likelihood more insight can be gained from segregating takeover targets into 
hostile or friendly than treating them as homogeneous. He cautions that:  
 
The use of a binomial specification to model takeover likelihood is likely to be 
incorrect and conclusions based on such a model are likely to be misleading and 
result in incorrect inferences regarding the characteristics of firms subject to 
takeover (Powell, 1997: 1026).   
   
The independent variables used in both models are: company size (SIZE), board 
composition (DUALITY and NONEXE), leverage (LEVERAGE), audit firm size 
(BIG-4), firm growth rate (GROWTH) and earnings volatility (VOLATILE). 
Although it is a prior not clear how earnings volatility is associated with the level 
of disclosure, we include it in our study as a control variable. Waymire (1985) 
shows that companies that issue management's earnings forecast more frequently 
have lower earnings volatility than companies that issue management's forecasts 
on an infrequent basis, consistent with Imhoff (1978) and Ruland (1979).  
 
The variables are measured as follows. SIZE is proxied by natural log of total 
assets.  DUALITY takes a value of 1 if the same person/family members hold(s) 
both the posts of chairman and CEO. NONEXE is the proportion of non 
executive directors. LEVERAGE is measured as total liabilities divided by total 
assets. BIG-4 takes a value of 1 if the company is audited by a "Big 4" firm 
(Arthur Andersen, Ernst and Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers). 
GROWTH is measured by taking the difference of total assets (TA) at year t and 
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year t–1 (TAt – TAt–1) and divided by TAt–1. In common with previous study by 
Mitchell et al. (1995), earnings volatility is measured by taking the difference 
between maximum and minimum profit before tax for five years divided by 
average profit before tax.  
 
Sample Characteristics 
 
A summary of the characteristics of sample companies is reported in Table 1. 
Panel A shows the characteristic of sample by board of exchange.  Twenty-two 
(68.75%) early adopters are from the Main Board and the other 10 (31.25%) are 
from the Second Board.  With respect to sector, nearly 70% come from four 
sectors namely construction, consumer products, industrial products and 
plantation.  Panels C and D display information on number of business segments 
and geographical segments. The early adopters have, on average, four business 
segments and 70% of them have not more than two geographical segments.  
Panel E shows that 20 early adopters adopted FRS 114 for their financial years 
ended on or before 31 December 2001 while another 12 adopted for financial 
years ended between 31 January 2002 and before 31 December 2002. The         
"Big 4" audits three quarter of early adopters. It is coincidental that the 
proportion of Big 4 auditor among the non early adopters is identical to early 
adopters. In terms of board leadership, 12 early adopters (about 37%) have 
duality board leadership structure where the same person or family members 
hold(s) both the CEO and Chairman roles.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics of continuous independent variables 
included in the study, partitioned by full early adopters, partial early adopters and 
non early adopters. Comparing between full early adopters and non early 
adopters shows that full early adopters are significantly larger, are more 
profitable, have significantly higher proportion of non independent non executive 
directors, and have lower leverage than non early adopters. The three subgroups, 
full early adopters, partial early adopters and non early adopters, are significantly 
different in terms of their sizes, profitabilities and proportions of non independent 
non executive directors. 
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TABLE 1 
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 Early 
adopter 
Non-early 
adopter 
Total 
Panel A: By Board of Exchange 
Main board 
Second board   
                                             
 
22 
10 
 
22 
10 
 
44 
20 
Panel B: By Sector 
Construction 
Consumer products 
Finance 
Industrial products 
Plantation 
Properties 
Technology 
Trading/services 
 
6 
7 
2 
6 
5 
3 
1 
2 
 
 
6 
7 
2 
6 
5 
3 
1 
2 
 
 
12 
14 
4 
12 
10 
6 
2 
4 
 
Panel C:  By Number of Business Segments 
               1 
               2 
               3 
               4 
               At least 5 
 
 
1 
4 
11 
4 
12 
 
1 
4 
11 
7 
9 
 
2 
8 
22 
11 
21 
Panel D: By Number of Geographical Segments 
               1 
               2 
               3 
               4 
              At least 5 
 
 
12 
10 
3 
   1 
 6 
   
 17 
7 
5 
2 
1 
 
 
29 
17 
8 
3 
7 
Panel E: By Year 
             2001 
             2002 
 
 
20 
12 
 
20 
12 
 
40 
24 
Panel F: By Auditor 
             Big 4 
             Non Big 4 
 
 
24 
8 
 
24 
8 
 
48 
16 
Panel G: By Duality 
Chairman and CEO same individual or family  
Chairman and CEO different individual and family 
  
 
12 
20 
 
10 
22 
 
22 
42 
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TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CONTINUOUS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
 
Mean 
T-statistic 
Full vs. Non early 
Full vs. Partial 
Partial vs. Non early 
F-statistic 
TA (total asset in RM billion): 
Full Adopter 
Partial Adopter 
Non early Adopter 
 
2.49 
0.46 
0.64 
 
  2.098** 
    2.287** 
–0.889 
 
 
 
7.078** 
 
SIZE (natural log of total asset) 
Full Adopter 
Partial Adopter 
Non early Adopter 
 
20.71 
19.24 
19.67 
 
   2.257** 
   2.908** 
–1.210 
 
 
 
5.573** 
 
PBT (profit before tax in RMmillion) 
Full Adopter 
Partial Adopter 
Non early Adopter 
 
154.0 
45.6 
–13.1 
 
2.112* 
1.312 
1.548 
 
 
 
4.535** 
 
Board Size: 
Full Adopter 
Partial Adopter 
Non early Adopter 
 
8.13 
7.65 
7.25 
 
1.322 
0.671 
0.740 
 
 
 
1.100 
 
NONEXE – % of non executives:  
Full Adopter 
Partial Adopter 
Non early Adopter 
 
0.71 
0.65 
0.59 
 
1.744* 
0.671 
1.146 
 
 
 
1.882 
 
INDEP – % of independent directors: 
Full Adopter 
Partial Adopter 
Non early Adopter 
 
0.36 
0.37 
0.39 
 
–0.831 
–0.323 
–0.507 
 
 
 
0.419 
 
GRAY – % of non independent non 
executives: 
Full Adopter 
Partial Adopter 
Non early Adopter 
 
 
0.35 
0.28 
0.20 
 
     
2.751** 
0.959 
    1.410 
 
 
 
 
3.567** 
 
LEVERAGE (total liabilities/total assets): 
Full Adopter 
Partial Adopter 
Non early Adopter 
 
0.39 
0.50 
0.62 
 
    –2.011* 
–0.832 
–0.836 
 
 
 
1.379 
 
(Continued on next page) 
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TABLE 2. (Continued) 
 
 
Mean 
T-statistic 
Full vs. Non early 
Full vs. Partial 
Partial vs. Non early 
F-statistic 
GROWTH ((TAt – TAt-1)/TAt-1): 
Full Adopter 
Partial Adopter 
Non early Adopter 
 
0.03 
0.02 
0.07 
 
–0.437 
0.282 
–0.572 
 
 
 
0.143 
 
VOLATILE (max(PBT) minus min(PBT) 
divide by average PBT over 5-year period).  
Full Adopter 
Partial Adopter 
Non early Adopter 
 
 
–0.01 
2.44 
0.20 
 
 
–0.125 
–1.198 
0.950 
 
 
 
 
0.660 
 
 
Full (n=15) and partial adopters (n=17) are subset of early adopters (n=32). There are 32 non early adopters. 
**significant at 5% level or better (two-tailed and assuming unequal variances). 
*  significant at 10% level or better (two-tailed and assuming unequal variances). 
 
 
Multivariate Analysis  
 
The Pearson and Spearman correlations between the variables are shown in  
Table 3. The proportion of non executive directors is positively correlated with 
firm size and Big 4 auditor whilst leverage is negatively correlated with earnings 
volatility.  However, none of the correlation coefficients among the independent 
variables are greater than 0.5. 
 
TABLE 3 
PEARSON AND SPEARMAN CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 SIZE DUALITY NONEXE LEVERAGE BIG-4 GROWTH VOLATILE 
SIZE 1.00 0.01 0.35** –0.12 0.22 –0.18 –0.14 
DUALITY  0.00 1.00 –0.10 0.02 –0.04 –0.13  0.03 
NONEXE 0.37** –0.10 1.00 –0.19 0.33**  0.01  0.07 
LEVERAGE 0.03 –0.14 –0.21 1.00 0.08 –0.16 –0.38** 
BIG-4 0.24 –0.04 0.34** 0.04 1.00 –0.18 –0.09 
GROWTH 0.06 –0.21 0.12 –0.32* 0.02  1.00 –0.01 
VOLATILE –0.08 –0.10 0.24 –0.48** –0.06  0.39**  1.00 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation is at diagonal up (down) 
** indicates significant at 1% level or better  
 * indicates significant at 5% level or better 
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Table 4 presents parameter estimates of binomial and multinomial models with 
corresponding coefficient values and standard errors. For the binomial regression 
(model 1), positive sign on a parameter indicates that an increase in the 
corresponding variable increases the likelihood of early adoption and a negative 
sign indicates the opposite. For the multinomial regression (model 2), the 
parameters are interpreted as indicating the probability of an event, either being a 
full adopter or partial adopter, relative to the probability of being non early 
adopter. 
 
TABLE 4 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF THE BINOMIAL AND MULTINOMIAL MODELS 
 
 Binomial – Model 1 Multinomial – Model 2 
 Full sample Full early adopter Partial early adopter 
Variables Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Coefficient Standard 
error 
Constant 
SIZE 
DUALITY 
NONEXE 
BIG-4 
LEVERAGE 
GROWTH 
VOLATILE 
–0.658 
–0.013 
0.340 
2.478* 
–0.389 
–0.843 
–0.669 
–0.004 
4.118 
0.214 
0.570 
1.528 
0.658 
0.720 
0.938 
0.041 
–11.758** 
  0.520* 
1.032 
2.279 
–0.810 
–1.554 
–0.298 
–0.038 
5.869 
0.298 
0.749 
2.122 
0.898 
1.277 
1.497 
0.071 
8.739 
–0.544* 
–0.484 
2.674 
0.042 
–0.622 
–1.052 
0.018 
5.909 
0.317 
0.753 
1.879 
0.810 
0.844 
1.180 
0.045 
      
 Model 1 Model 2  
Likelihood Ratio             82.441 110.768*    
Nagelkerke R2     0.125   0.335 
McFadden R2   – 0.167 
Hosmer and Lemeshow 8.271 – 
Percentage Correct  59.4% 60.9% 
 
In model 1, the dependent variable is dichotomous and takes the value of either 1 (early adopters) or 0 (non early adopters). In 
model 2, the dependent variable is trichotomous and takes the value of  0  (full early adopters), 1 (partial early adopters) and         
2 (non early adopters). ** indicates significant at 5% level or better and *  indicates significant at 10% level or better. 
 
 
For model 1, the Nagelkerke R2 of 0.125 indicates mild relationship between 
dependent variable and independent variables. In addition the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow goodness of fit gives a chi-square of 8.271 (level of significance is 
0.407) which indicates a good model fit between the actual and predicted value of 
the dependent variable. The percentage of correct classification for model 1 is 
59.4%. The result reveals NONEXE is significant at 10% level with positive 
direction. This suggests that the higher the composition of non executive 
directors on the board the higher the likelihood for company to early adopt FRS 
114. Although not reported in Table 4, interesting evidence is found when 
replacing NONEXE with INDEP and GRAY. INDEP is found to be insignificant, 
whilst GRAY is significant at 5% level with positive direction. This indicates that 
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the so-called gray or affiliated directors, rather than independent directors, may 
play important role in influencing early adoption. The results are consistent with 
the univariate analysis that shows early adopters have significantly higher 
percentage of gray directors than non early adopters, whilst the proportions of 
independent directors are almost identical for early and non early adopters. 
 
For model 2, the likelihood ratio is 110.768 and significant at ten percent level. 
When early adopters are partitioned into full adopters and partial adopters, the 
strength of the relationship as indicated by the Nagelkerke R2 is higher than 
model 1. Thus the multinomial model has a better explanatory power than the 
binary model that treats full and partial early adopters as homogeneous group. 
For full early adopters, SIZE is found to be significant at 10%  level with positive 
coefficient which suggests that larger firm is more likely to early adopt FRS 114 
(with full disclosure) and less likely to delay adoption of FRS 114. For partial 
early adopters, SIZE is found to be significant at 10% level but has negative 
coefficient which suggests that smaller firms tend to adopt FRS 114 early, albeit 
not in full compliance, as opposed to delay adopting FRS 114.  However, in the 
binary model there is no evidence that firm size is an important characteristic that 
distinguishes between firms that elect early adoption versus defer adoption until 
the mandatory date. Thus, the model that pools full and partial early adopters as 
homogeneous is probably misspecified and yields spurious result that obscures 
the effect of firm size. Although not reported in Table 4, when NONEXE is 
replaced with GRAY in model 2, the results are qualitatively similar except that 
GRAY is now significant at 10% level with positive coefficients for both full 
early adopters and partial early adopters. 
 
 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The study reveals some distinguishing characteristics of early adopters of FRS 
114. First, full early adopters have larger assets than non early adopters. Second, 
company with smaller assets size also made early adoption but they only 
complied partially with the required segment disclosures. Third, the evidence 
suggests that non executive directors do play some role towards early adoption of 
FRS 114. However, the evidence indicates that it is the gray rather than 
independent directors who probably make the difference between electing for 
early adoption or delaying adoption. This echoes the view expressed in The 
Economist (2004) that shareholders might feel they were being better served by 
the presence of non executive directors who are affiliated with the company. One 
of the criticisms leveled against independent directors is that they may not behave 
independently. In addition, unlike affiliated non executive directors, the 
independent directors may lack the necessary knowledge as The Economist 
(2004) aptly put it: the price of independent is ignorance. More recently, the 
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Asian Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee has expressed doubt on the 
efficacy of "amateur part-timers" independent directors and further suggested that 
controlling shareholders should be excluded from voting for independent 
directors to ensure that the minority shareholders are protected (Statement No. 3 
released during the 16th Asian Finance Association Conference, July 2005). 
 
The study is not without its limitations. Apart from small sample size and not 
considering geographical segment disclosures, the low R2 suggests that there may 
be other important variables that are left out. One possibility is ownership 
structure. Recent studies which show that ownership structure influences the 
level of disclosure include Chau and Gray (2002), and Leung and Horwitz 
(2004). It is interesting to see whether the inclusion of ownership variable would 
improve the model, and to compare the determinants of early adoption for 
standard that affect the extent of disclosure only against standard that affect 
income and balance sheet figures, such as FRS 136 on Impairment of Assets. 
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